This article assumes that social comparisons (a) constitute comparative judgments governed by the general process that applies to all judgments, (b) possess a common comparative structure including simple judgments of comparison stimuli and their juxtaposition, and (c) possess unique contents that determine the subjective meanings of comparison outcomes and their psychological implications. Examined in these terms, classical social comparison theory is found wanting in two respects: (a) It conveys a relatively fixed notion of social comparison in which people are generally driven to compare and do so mostly with respect to similar others and predominantly for the sake of evaluative accuracy. (b) Its narrow scope excludes numerous significant issues of interest to social comparison research today. It is proposed that the present, multilevel approach is useful for ordering past social comparison research and provides a heuristically rich paradigm for future work.
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of the critical similarity dimension has been proposed, in terms o fsimilarity in attributes related to an opinion or a performance rather than similarity in opinion or performance per se (Berscheid, 1966; Goethals & Darley, 1977) .
Despite these revisions, fundamental aspects of Festinger's original conception have remained intact, notably that (a) another person's similarity to oneself (however defined) is a crucial parameter of social comparison; (b) if not exactly of a "drive-like" quality, there exists a fairly general and pervasive tendency toward social comparison, and (c) the processes of social comparison differ across content domains of comparison. For instance, a "unidirectional drive to do better and better" exists when comparing one's abilities but not one's opinions (Festinger, 1954a) , and a preference for similar others is more pronounced in the domain of values than that of opinions (Goethals & Darley, 1977) .
Generally, social comparison processes pertain to comparative judgments that people render about their various attributes. Therefore, most social psychologists would probably agree that if one applied what is known about the judgmental process to the social comparison domain, there should be no disagreement. Surprisingly, however, examination of the social comparison theory from a general judgmental perspective reveals several major incompatibilities. One of the goals of this article is to identify these discrepancies and appraise pertinent social comparison hypotheses in light of current judgmental theory and research.
Furthermore, classical comparison research has focused on a restricted range of topics concerning, in particular, locus of comparison issues (e.g, Gruder, 1971 ) and the role of interpersonal similarity in the comparison process (e.g., Goethals & Nelson, 1973) . Such restriction of focus omits important comparison concerns that clearly deserve the attention of social psychologists. Indeed, in recent years several lines of social comparison work have been undertaken that do not readily fit the traditional molds of social comparison theory. Such research includes attempts to map out the diverse types of possi-ble comparisons (Higgins, in press; Levine & Moreland, 1986 Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988; M. Ross, Eyman, & Kishchuk, 1986) , to explore the affective consequences of comparison against qualitatively different standards (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Major & Testa, 1989; Olson & Ross, 1984) , and to investigate the psychological significance of the distinction between the subject and the referent of comparison (Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1989; Tversky, 1977) . This research is discussed in more detail later. Its existence and scope, however, raise the need for a broader conception of social comparison phenomena capable of addressing both the traditional comparison concerns and those investigated outside the classical paradigm. A major purpose of this article is to outline such an integrative conception.
A Three-Level Analysis of Social Comparisons
We define social comparisons broadly as comparative judgments of social stimuli on particular content dimensions. This framing implies that social comparison phenomena can be approached on three levels of analysis. The most general level is that of the judgmental process that social comparisons as judgments must follow. The second level recognizes that social comparisons as a category share a special kind of judgmental structure: They represent comparative judgments, including simple judgments (e.g., of stimulus A and stimulus B) as well as their juxtaposition (i.e., A vs. B). The third and most specific level refers to the unique contents of a given comparison, including, for example, the specific domain of comparison (e.g., academic achievement) and the specific social stimuli being compared (e.g., self vs. friend). Such specific contents of comparisons may often drive both specific affect and overt action instigated by a given comparison outcome.
We assume that the judgmental process principles apply (among others) to all social judgments whose structure is comparative. However, not all phenomena governed by the general judgmental process are comparative (i.e., some judgments are noncomparative). Furthermore, the same comparative structure is common to all possible contents of social comparison; obviously, however, not all comparative judgments share the same contents of comparison. More important, we will attempt to show that each of the foregoing three levels of analysis explains unique aspects of social comparisons and, therefore, that all are needed for a complete understanding of comparison phenomena.
Judgmental Process Factors in Social Comparison

Theory of Lay Epistemics
The following portrayal of social judgment is based on our theory of lay epistemics described in detail elsewhere (Kruglanski, 1980 (Kruglanski, , 1989 Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Klar, 1987; , 1988 . The lay epistemic theory addresses the general process whereby persons form their judgments. Thus, the theory aims at identifying the underlying common principles of numerous midrange social cognitive theories as attribution (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Kruglanski, 1980) , dissonance and balance (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Kruglanski & Klar, 1987) , notions of judgmental heuristics (Kruglanski, 1989b; Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) , or attitudes (Kruglanski, 1989a) . The lay epistemic theory is outlined briefly below, highlighting aspects germane to the social comparison topic.
Epistemic Sequence: Hypothesis Evaluation
The process of knowledge formation is assumed to include two interwoven stages--hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation. The evaluation process consists of considering the hypothesis in light of relevant evidence. In turn, relevance means that the hypothesis and the evidence are linked in the individual's mind in an "if-then" fashion) In other words, relevance depends on the person's subjective inference rules in which a given category of evidence implies the hypothesis. For instance, an individual may subscribe to the rule that "the total on a purchase bill is the sum of the individual prices plus tax." This establishes, for example, that individual prices are relevant evidence for inference of the total; specifically, fthe individual prices are x and y, then the total is z (their sum). Alternatively, the individual may subscribe to the rule that "Jane is an arithmetic genius," which (by implication) establishes Jane's opinion as also relevant to inference of the total (reasoning that "if Jane says the bill amounts to a given sum, this must be so").
For an opinion to form, the general inference rule invoked must be instantiated for the situation at hand. Thus, the specific details of the evidence need to be ascertained (e.g., the complete list of the individual prices or Jane's specific opinion), allowing the derivation of the specific judgment implied by the rule (e.g., that the total bill amounts to a given figure).
Hypothesis Generation
Often the individual may have available in memory several different rules pertinent to the same problem, for example, linking different types of evidence to the same judgment or linking the same type of evidence to different judgments (or "competing hypotheses"). Yet further rules may be constructed by the individual under appropriate circumstances.
The lay epistemic model recognizes two broad categories of factors that govern the amount and type of rules considered by the individual. These categories relate to considerations of accessibility (e.g., Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) and motivation (Kruglanski, 1989a, in press) . A given rule is likely to be invoked if it is currently accessible in memory, for example, because of its recent or frequent activation (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985) .
The epistemic motivations relevant to rule generation are the need for cognitive closure, reflecting the desire for a definite answer on a topic and an intolerance of ambiguity; the need to avoid closure, reflecting the desire to suspend judgmental com-
The "logical" if-then structure is assumed to also apply to statistical inference in which the antecedent terms (e.g., properties of a distribution of scores) imply a probability (e.g., that a score falls within a given range of values). For a detailed discussion of the common process of logical and statistical inference, see Klar (1989) . mitment; and needs for specific closure or the avoidance of specific closure, reflecting the desire to reach or avoid specific answers to one's questions. In general, the various epistemic motivations are assumed to bias rule generation toward desired epistemic end states. For example, the need for cognitive closure may restrict the number of inference rules being considered, whereas the need to avoid closure may increase their number . Furthermore, needs for (or for the avoidance of) specific closure may bias the generation of rules toward those presumed to provide the desired answer.
Implications for Social Comparison Processes
We now consider some implications of our epistemic analysis for social comparison phenomena, starting with the issue of conditions for comparison.
Conditions for Comparison (the "When" Question)
First, we assume that no social comparison will occur unless the individual has at least some interest in comparative knowledge on a topic, that is, some degree of the need for closure or for a specific closure on this issue. Note that not every absence of comparative knowledge instigates a desire for knowledge. Occasionally, it fulfills a wish to avoid closure and affords a welcome suspension of commitment (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Snyder & Wicklund, 1981; Kruglanski, in press ).
Second, we assume that the epistemic motivations are based on the perceived benefits and costs of attaining an answer (or a specific answer) to a comparative question (Kruglanski, in press ). In turn, the perceived benefits or costs of comparative answers are likely to vary across situations, cultures, or personality types. For instance, attendance at a professional convention may make salient to oneself one's career goals. This may enhance the perceived benefits of knowledge about one's relative accomplishments compared to one's peers, setting forth a process of social comparison. Similarly, a competitive culture may foster greater interest in comparisons than a less competitive culture, and a competitive person may generally have greater interest in social comparisons than a less competitive individual. Unlike classical social comparison formulations, then, we are not assuming a general "drive" to self-evaluate leading to social comparison, or even a pervasive tendency to socially compare. Instead, we assume that interest in social comparison will vary, depending on the subjective value for the individual of a given kind of comparative knowledge.
Choice and Impact of the Comparison Other (the "Who" Question)
Motivational compatibility A fundamental question raised by social comparison theory in its original version (Festinger, 1954a (Festinger, , 1954b concerned the type of comparison others 2 to which people normally turn for information and the impact that information from different such social sources has on people's opinions. Early social comparison theory answered the question by highlighting in this connection the role of the similar other, Specifically, individuals were presumed to exhibit general preference for information from similar (vs. dissimilar) others and to derive greater confidence from such information. In contrast, our lay epistemic analysis suggests that no general tendency to choose or be influenced by similar others should be expected. Instead, the choice and impact of comparison others may be determined by factors that affect those matters for any informational source. The likelihood that the source will furnish motivationaily compatible information is one such factor. Results of social comparison research are generally consistent with the motivational compatibility hypothesis. Thus, Broadbeck (1956) reported that the tendency to choose a similar other for comparison varied as an inverse function of subjective confidence. Worchel and McCormick 0963) found greater liking for an agreeing other after the subject encountered several previous disagreements as compared with several agreements. Similarly, Shrauger and Jones 0968) found more liking for agreers, and disliking for disagreers, when the answer to a judgmental issue was unclear (vs. clear) to subjects. In all the foregoing cases, subjects may have a stronger need to believe that they are right after their self-confidence has been lowered. Such need for specific closure may induce greater liking for, or choice of, the agreeing other who furnishes motivationally compatible information. Kruglanski and Mayseless (1987) recently conducted four experimental studies to test the effects of motivational variables on comparison preferences for similarly versus dissimilarly minded others. In one study subjects' defensiveness was aroused by instructions that they would have to justify their opinions to others. In another condition, subjects' "fear of invalidity" was aroused by instructions that accurate opinions would qualify them for a monetary reward. Subjects in the former condition preponderantly chose to compare with similar others, whereas those in the latter condition preponderantly chose to compare with dissimilar others. Further experiments replicated the finding that high (vs. low) fear of invalidity induces a tendency to compare with dissimilar others. In addition, these experiments demonstrated that high (vs. low) need for cognitive closure enhances the tendency to compare with similar others.
It appears, then, that either similarly or dissimilarly minded others may be chosen for comparison to the extent that the information they are expected to provide is compatible with the choosers' motivation. Similar motivational effects emerged in studies that referred to similarity of general attitudes or attri-2 In past research the term comparison other has been used indiscriminately in two separate senses. One sense denotes a social source o f information that may be used to examine any question of interest, for example, where relevant "physical sources" are unavailable (Festinger, 1954a) . In this sense, comparison with a "similar other" amounts to seeking the information (on any topic) from persons resembling oneself on some dimension. Our discussion of the judgmental process refers to this sense of(source) similarity. In the second sense, the "comparison other" relates the specific content of a question in which people may have an interest (Smith, 1981 ) and that concerns one's standing on some dimension relative to another individual. The similarity issue here is whether persons are predominantly interested in how they measure up against similar or dissimilar others. This latter sense of similarity, logically unrelated to the former, is intended in our discussion of comparison contents. butes related to the opinion rather than to the similarity of the opinion as such (Goethals & Nelson, 1973) . For example, Reckman and found that subjects concerned with accuracy had equal preference to compare with others dissimilar or similar on related attributes. Subjects concerned with congenial association preferred similar over dissimilar others. Fazio (1979) combined both agreement and similarity in one experimental design and found that when subjects' goal was belief confirmation (the "motive for validation" condition), their tendency to choose similar or agreeing others was higher than when their goal was accuracy (the "motive for construction" condition).
The generalization that a choice of an informational source is a combined function of the chooser's motivation and of (the content of) motivationally compatible information should apply to numerous additional variables besides agreement and attribute similarity A case in point is recent research by Taylor and her associates on "downward" and "upward" comparisons (Taylor & Dakof, 1988; Taylor, Falke, Shoptaw, & Lichtman, 1986; Taylor & Lobei, in press ). Specifically, these investigators found that cancer patients often self-evaluate by referring to less fortunate others (downward comparison) even as they predominantly affiliate with and seek information from more fortunate others (upward comparison). A likely interpretation of these data is that patients might be interested in (at least) two questions: (a) How well are they coping relative to other patients? and (b) How likely are they to recover? Note that a desirable answer (closure) to the first question is that they are coping relatively well; this answer is provided by a downward comparison. In contrast, a desirable answer to the second question is that they are highly likely to recover and is served by an upward comparison (which may increase the perceived base rate of recovery). In short, upward as well as downward comparisons (interestingly, both with dissimilar others) may reflect the tendency to choose sources perceived likely to yield motivationally compatible information.
The above discussion suggests that the nature (or content) of information compatible with a need for specific closure is highly dependent on the context: Occasionally, it may come from a similar other, and at other times, from a dissimilar other. Occasionally, it is yielded by a downward comparison and, at other times, by an upward comparison. Such contextual dependence of motivationally compatible information is further illustrated by Tesser's (1988) work on self-esteem maintenance. Specifically, whereas Festinger (1954a) implied that for abilities, the individual would be pleased only on knowing that she or he outperformed similar others, Tesser (1989) theorized that this may hold only for abilities relevant to the self-concept. On irrelevant abilities, the individual may be quite pleased, in fact, ira certain type of similar other (with whom one has a unit relation) did better than most people, including oneself. Research by Tesser and colleagues (Tesser & Campbell, 1982; Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 1984) as well as by Cialdini and Richardson (1980) and Cialdini et ai. (1976) suggests that such situations allow one to "bask in reflected glory" and can be quite rewarding emotionally
In fact, the contextual dependencies involved could be even more intricate than Tesser's hypothesis suggests. Thus, for some types of close relations the reflected-glory phenomenon might extend to self-relevant abilities as well. It seems plausible to assume that parents may often feel proud when they are outperformed by their children, even (and, perhaps, especially) when the ability is self-relevant (hence considered valuable and important). Teachers outperformed by their favorite students might feel the same way Thus, in some contexts doing less well than another person might be motivationally compatible with desirable closures such as "I have been a good parent (teacher)" or "my child (student) is likely to succeed:' Role of relevance. Beyond motivational considerations, the choice and impact of the comparison other may be affected by the degree to which the information she or he is expected to provide appears relevant to the judgment at hand (in the sense of being linked to the judgment by one's subjective rule of inference). We will review some evidence concerning this notion.
In a study by Olson, Ellis, and Zanna (1983) , male subjects tended more to seek consensus information when judgments (of physical attractiveness) were depicted as objective rather than subjective. Presumably, in dealing with objective judgments subjects may entertain the hypothesis that their impressions are colored by personal bias. Consensus information is relevant to testing such a personal-bias hypothesis; thus, it may be sought out under those circumstances. This may affect not only who will be chosen for comparison but whether comparison will take place at all.
In an earlier study on the effects of comparison, Goethals (1972) found that agreement from a dissimilar other raised subjects' confidence more than agreement from a similar other. This finding was qualified by results of Goethals and Nelson (1973) indicating that in the realm of value, subjects' confidence rose more following agreement from a similar (vs. a dissimilar) other. On the basis of those findings, Goethals and Darley (1977) theorized that when people make value judgments, agreement from a similar other has greater impact than that from a dissimilar other, because someone with divergent values may not seem relevant as a source of information. On the other hand, when people evaluate their beliefs, agreement from a dissimilar other is given greater weight, as it is more informative than agreement from a similar other. The last prediction is derived from Kelley's (1967) attributional analysis that similar others may share one's own biases. In such a case, they may not provide diagnostic information indicating whether the judgments represent bias or the true nature of the entity Broadly speaking, the dissimilar other in this case has more relevant information than a similar other, where relevance denotes information diagnosticity (Trope & Bassok, 1983 ) that allows one to confidently make a given judgment.
In other words, both the greater impact of agreement by the similar other when the topic is values and the greater impact of agreement by the dissimilar other when the topic is beliefs seem mediated by the general judgmental variable of perceived relevance. Specifically, a source seen to possess more relevant information therefore has more impact on the individual's confidence than a source with less apparently relevant information. The question, however, is whether similarity and dissimilarity are uniformly related to relevance in the domains of values and beliefs. On close examination, the answer would seem to be negative for both domains. Instead, whether the similar other is also the relevant other may depend largely on the specific context.
Consider the domain of values, first using Goethals and Darley's (1977, p. 271) following example:
Someone wants to decide which of two novels to take with him on a short vacation. He is familiar with the authors of both books from other works they have published. He makes the tentative evaluation that he would enjoy the book by author A more than the one by author B, but would like to check it.
Goethals and Darley compellingly argued that in this case, one would be more likely to seek the advice of a similar (vs. a dissimilar) other, someone who is likely to share one's literary tastes and preferences. In other words, in evaluating what is "good" or "worthwhile;' people are likely to consult others who share their criteria for "goodness." Hence, when choosing a book one is more likely to consult with a friend who shares his or her taste for political biography (i.e., a "similar other") than one for whom good reading is primarily science fiction.
However, when similarity of criteria can be assumed, one may seek the advice of someone with special ability to determine how a given object measures up against those criteria. Thus, in selecting the films they are planning to view this summer, people may often heed the advice of the Times" critic (a dissimilar other) over and above that of a friend who, although sharing their criteria for good entertainment, may be less reliable in determining whether the criteria are met by a particular movie.
Occasionally, people might worry that their preference for a given entity has been biased by situational factors. In such a case, they might prefer to consult someone who has not been subjected to the same kind of influence, and in this sense is a dissimilar other. For example, Paul might suspect that his liking for an expensive car has been unduly affected by the charisma and persuasion techniques of the salesperson at his neighborhood dealership. To check up on his impressions, he might prefer to consult with John, who has not accompanied him on his car shopping visit (using an inference heuristic of "objectivity"), rather than with Dave, who has.
The foregoing examples suggest that in the domain of values, similarity is not uniformly related to relevance. Depending on th e context, a similar or a dissimilar other could appear to have the more relevant information, and hence be selected for comparison purposes. The same conclusion seems to apply to beliefs. Admittedly, people concerned about bias in their own beliefs may seek an opinion of someone not sharing the same bias, that is, a dissimilar other (Goethals & Darley, 1977) . However, the hypothesis of bias (whether in preferences or beliefs) need not be invariably accessed by the individual (Higgins & King, 1981) , and when it is not, a person exposed to a different source of potential bias need not be preferred over one exposed to a similar source of bias.
Furthermore, commonality of potential biases constitutes but one similarity dimension. On alternative dimensions, a similar (vs. a dissimilar) other may appear to possess the more relevant information, and therefore be preferred for a belief comparison. Thus, for an expert, other (similar) experts may be perceived as more relevant sources of information than nonexperts. Furthermore, a person with an interest in an activity (e.g., football or the stock market) may expect persons who share his or her interests (i.e., similar others) to keep abreast of developments in that field, and thus possess more relevant information than persons not sharing those interests.
It appears, then, that similarity is not uniformly related to relevance in the domains of values or beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that relevance would play the same role in inference across possible alternative classifications of comparison domains. For example, a relevant other may be preferred as a source of information in the domain of emotions (Schachter, 1959) , the domain of motor behaviors (e.g, the tennis pro, the ballet instructor), and so forth. In these alternative domains as well, there does not seem to exist a uniform relation between similarity and relevance.
Rule accessibility and comparison choice. As implied earlier, the choice of the comparison other could often depend on considerations of rule accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins et al, 1985; Wyer & Srull, 1981 ). Thus, accessibility of the rule "peers know best" probably held by many teenagers, may direct comparison choices toward similar others, whereas accessibility of the rule "expert knows best;' or "grown-ups know best," may bias comparison preferences toward dissimilar others. To our knowledge, no direct evidence exists for such accessibility effects, but they could be profitably explored in future comparison research.
Domain Differentiation of Social Comparison Phenomena (the "What" Question)
Classical social comparison theory has typically implied that social comparison processes differ across domains of comparison. Thus, Festinger (1954a) drew the widely known distinction between the comparison of opinions and abilities; Schachter (1959) identified the domain of emotion comparisons; and Goethals and Darley (1977) distinguished between the comparison of values and beliefs.
Interestingly, alongside the trend of domain differentiation, an opposite trend toward integration was apparent. Specifically, several analysis addressed social comparison processes occurring across domains and treated them from more general perspectives. For example, Singer (1966) proposed that people compare with others in order to generally evaluate their self-esteem rather than assess only an isolated opinion or ability. Pettigrew (1967) proposed to include social comparison theory within a general theory of social evaluation. Mettee and Smith (1977) suggested incorporating the theory of social comparison within a more comprehensive theory of self-knowledge, and Goethals (1986) proposed that social comparison theory deal with the general question of self-evaluation.
Our lay epistemic analysis of social comparison phenomena continues the latter integrative trend. As noted earlier, we assume that the judgmental level of analysis is applicable across different contents (or content domains) of social comparison and beyond, to all kinds of noncomparative judgments. All social comparisons are assumed to deal with persons' attempts to form judgments or opinions. In this sense, abilities comparison is a special case of opinions comparison, namely of opinions about one's abilities (Jones & Gerard, 1967) . In like fashion, emotional comparisons (Schachter, 1959 ) concern people's opinions about their emotions, and value comparisons (Goethals & Darley, 1977) concern opinions about people's values.
We will consider what this analysis implies for putative distinctions in process assumed to separate different comparison domains.
Abilities versus opinions: The unidirectional drive upward.
Festinger (1954a, p. 124) assumed the existence of"a unidirec-tional drive upward in the case of abilities which is largely absent in opinions." As already noted, this "drive" represents a need for specific closure, notably that one is superior to similar others on some dimension. If so, (a) appropriate counterparts of the "drive upward" should exist outside the abilities domain, as needs for specific closure may arise with respect to diverse content domains of knowledge. (b) Even within the abilities domain, the drive upward need not operate invariantly, as needs for specific closure are assumed to often be context dependent. (c) Directly opposite tendencies to the upward drive (i.e., "drives downward") might occasionally exist in the abilities domains, as opposite contents of closure may be occasionally preferred in different circumstances.
In support of the first implication, "false consensus" research (Campbell, 1986; Marks, 1984) suggests that a counterpart of the biasing "drive upward," namely a biased preference for the conclusion that one was right, may affect'the comparison of various opinions (not necessarily related to one's abilities). Relevant to the second implication, work by Trope (1975 Trope ( , 1980 has demonstrated that in the abilities domain people may often be interested in accurate assessment rather than exhibiting an upward bias. As for the third implication, it seems plausible that occasionally people might find it desirable to conclude that their ability in a domain is lower than that of others.
For instance, a high status person may find it desirable to admit to personal weaknesses (e.g., poor memory or indifferent culinary skills) that his or her coworkers might find endearing (cf. Aronson, Willerman, & Floyd, 1966) , or a judgment that one's fitness is poor may excuse one from volunteering for a strenuous activity. The foregoing need not represent inauthentic "excuses" that one tends to doubt privately. In particular, where self-misrepresentations are seen to carry distasteful moral overtones (e.g., of shirking an obligation one considers of major ethical importance), a person may be strongly motivated to actually adopt the convenient beliefs rather than cynically misleading others about their validity,
The remaining epistemic motivations (e.g., the need for [nonspecific] closure or the need to avoid closure) are also assumed to affect the formation of opinions in general, and thus to be equally applicable to various content domains of comparison. For example, under a high need for closure a person may "freeze" on a momentarily accessible evaluation of his or her ability even if it is an unflattering one (L. Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) . Similarly, under a high need to avoid closure (e.g., induced by accuracy concerns) a person may be ready to "unfreeze" a positive self-assessment and pay close attention to information inconsistent with such an assessment. According to Festinger (1954a, p. 125) , "there are non-social restraints which make it difficult or even impossible to change one's ability. These nonsocial restraints are largely absent for opinions" Note that this juxtaposition of abilities and opinions does not really apply if the social comparison of abilities actually concerns opinions about relative abilities. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the distinction at issue might be that opinions about one's abilities are generally less malleable than opinions about other objects. On reflection, however, this may strictly depend on the ability or the object in question. For instance, L. Ross et al. (1975) effected a quick change in subjects' opinions about their ability (to accurately identify authentic suicide notes) through simple experimental feedback. By contrast, opinions about objects other than abilities (e.g., about ethical and aesthetic values or ideological doctrines) may be extremely rigid and refractory to change. In general, one's readiness to change one's opinion is assumed to depend on cognitive and motivational factors (e.g., accessibility of alternative opinions or need for closure) that affect the epistemic process at large rather than on the contents of specific opinions (e.g., concerning abilities or alternative objects).
Malleability of abilities and opinions.
Value-belief distinction. From this perspective, recall Goethals and Darley's (1977) distinction between the comparison of values versus beliefs. As already implied, it is possible to think of value comparisons as referring to beliefs about values. Furthermore, the proposal that similar (vs. dissimilar) others are preferred as a source of information for values but not for beliefs was reconceptualized earlier to mean that a source with more seemingly relevant information on a topic is preferred over a less relevant source. Such generalization is assumed to hold across values and beliefs, but in neither domain should a necessary correlation between relevance and similarity be expected. In short, the (judgmental) process of comparison (e.g., the role of variables such as relevance or the role of epistemic motivations) seems uniform across content domains o fcomparison (e.g., those of values, abilities, or other topics).
Summary
Our judgmental analysis of social comparison phenomena reveals several major discrepancies from classical comparison theory. First, rather than assuming a pervasive tendency ("drive") to engage in (self-evaluation leading to) comparison, we have assumed that interest in comparative knowledge depends on the individual's epistemic motivations that may vary as a function of situational, personality, and cultural factors. Second, rather than assuming a general preference for, and greater impact of comparison with, the similar other, we have argued that both preference and impact depend on presumed motivational compatibility, perceived relevance, and rule accessibility, none of which seem generally correlated with similarity. Third, rather than assuming that the comparison process differs across content domains of comparison, we have argued that the process is essentially uniform across domains.
Discrepancies from classical notions aside, the present judgmental analysis affords testable hypotheses concerning the conditions for engaging in comparison, the preferred source of comparison information, and the likely course of the comparison process. For instance, it should be possible to assess chronic individual differences in the perceived benefits of comparative knowledge and to investigate whether such differences are related to the tendency to compare. In addition, perceived benefits or costs of comparative knowledge and perceived discrepancies between actual and desired confidence in such knowledge should have systematic effects on comparison tendencies that could be studied experimentally. The suggestion that persons' subjective rules of inference (inference heuristics) may govern the choice of comparison information, and of its source, could be fruitfully investigated, possibly through preassessment of chronic differences in the accessibility of various such rules (cf. Higgins et al., 1982) or through situational priming. Finally, we are predicting that the number and types of rules being accessed, and the consequent duration and direction of the comparison process, will depend on the individual's epistemic motivations: need for cognitive closure, need to avoid closure, and needs for specific closures and the avoidance of specific closures . These notions too seem well deserving of further study In short, the epistemic analysis of the judgmental process has novel implications for the study of conditions for comparison, preferred sources of comparison information, and the duration and direction of the comparison process. It thus represents a useful conceptual framework for future comparison research.
Comparative-Structure Considerations
Whereas the process discussed above is assumed to apply to all types of judgments, social comparisons represent a unique category of judgments: They are distinguished by their compound structure defining the requisite evidence for a comparative conclusion. For instance, evidence that John has more of an attribute X than Dave requires that one determine a (John's standing on X) and b (Dave's standing on X), and then juxtapose a and b. The unique structural properties of comparative judgments imply effects that are not predictable from mere consideration of the general judgmental process. Below we discuss some such structural effects, specifically those related to (a) contextual differences in encoding the separate comparison stimuli, (b) determinants of coaccessibility, and (c) featurematching processes.
Contextual Differences in Encoding Comparison Stimuli
Systematic differences in contexts of encoding individual comparison stimuli can qualify as structural determinants of the comparison outcome. Several relevant aspects of such differences deserve mention, including differential accessibility of the "data" to be encoded, differential accessibility of constructs, and presence of situational standards for encoding the data (Higgins & Stangor, 1988) .
Thus, in assessing the relative performance of two basketball players, one may be swayed by the readily accessible outcomes of their recent games. Such data may serve as anchors that are insufficiently adjusted (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) to ultimately yield inappropriate comparison outcomes. For instance, even if Johnson's and Bird's seasonal per game scoring averages are equal, one might evaluate the former as superior to the latter if he had scored higher in the last two games.
Even if the perceived data were identical, the comparison stimuli could still be encoded differently depending on momentarily accessible constructs. For instance, if in interpreting Bird's 30-point average per game the accessible construct was "effort," whereas in interpreting Johnson's identical average the accessible construct was "ability,' one might conclude that Bird is more motivated than Johnson, or that Johnson is more talented than Bird.
Whereas construct accessibility is typically considered a feature of the perceiver's internal state, encoding may vary also as a function of the external context. Differences in such contexts between the comparison stimuli could, therefore, appropriately affect the outcome of the comparison. The work of Higgins and his associates on the formation and change of judgmental standards has important implications in this regard. For example, in a study by Higgins and Lurie (1983) , subjects read about Judge Jones, who gave moderate sentences, and other trial judges who gave either higher sentences (harsh context condition) or lower sentences than did Judge Jones. A contrast effect obtained such that subjects judged the sentencing decisions of Judge Jones as more lenient in the harsh encoding context and as harsher in the lenient encoding context. The extrapolation of such findings to social comparison effects seems straightforward: If subjects were to compare the relative leniency of a judge previously encountered in a lenient context with that of a judge previously encountered in a harsh context, they might conclude that the former judge is harsher than the latter even though their actual sentencing decisions may have been similar. Those notions could be profitably pursued in further research.
The foregoing example assumes that (a) the context of recall in which the social comparison took place did not further affect subjects' judgmental standards, and (b) it did not do so for either comparison stimulus (i.e., either judge). Neither of the foregoing conditions needs to hold. Thus, in a study by Higgins and Stangor (1988) , subjects read about the moderate sentences given by Judge Jones in the context of harsher or more lenient judges, and were asked to assess Judge Jones's relative leniency. One week later, they read about Judge Cohen, whose sentencing decisions were similar to those of Judge Jones, also in the context of more lenient or harsher judges. Subjects then were asked to recall the sentencing decisions of Judge Cohen and also those of Judge Jones. When the context in which subjects rated Judge Jones's decisions (harsh or lenient) differed from the context in which they rated Judge Cohen's decisions, recall of Judge Jones's sentencing decisions was affected by (a) assessment of his harshness or leniency dependent on the context of judgment, and (b) a general norm reflecting decisions that subjects reconstructed from both the context of judgment and that of recall. Consequently, the sentencing decisions recalled for Judge Jones were strikingly different than those recalled for Judge Cohen, for whom the context of judgment was also that of recall.
The implications of these findings for social comparison outcomes are intriguing. Consider a situation in which Judge Jones gives moderate prison sentences (averaging 5 years) in a harsh context (of judges averaging 7 years), leading to his assessment as "lenient," whereas Judge Cohen gives the same moderate sentences in a lenient context (of judges averaging 3 years), leading to his assessment as "harsh." The outcome of comparing the two judges' decisions should vary depending on the norm extant at the time of comparison. Thus, if the comparison norm is a diluted standard combining the two contexts (i.e., 5 years on the average), the reconstructed decisions for (the "lenient") Judge Jones should be below that norm (e.g., 3 years on the average), whereas the reconstructed decisions for (the "harsh") Judge Cohen should be above that norm (e.g, 7 years on the average). If judgments of relative leniency followed the recall of sentencing decisions, an exaggerated difference should result, with Judge Jones being perceived as considerably more lenient than Judge Cohen. This difference should be less if for at least one of the judges the recall was constrained by the undiluted judgmental context (leading to an accurate recall of 5 years of sentencing for that judge). The difference between the reconstructed decisions and the subsequent judgments of relative leniency should be least if for both judges recall was constrained by the respective judgmental contexts (leading to an average recalled sentence of 5 years for both judges). Those notions too could be profitably investigated in future comparison research.
To summarize, contextual differences in judgments of individual comparison stimuli could have important effects on the ultimate comparison outcome. Such differences could arise because of differential data or construct accessibility processes and the formation of separate standards for the comparison stimuli.
Determinants of Coaccessibility
A necessary condition for a social comparison is that the separate judgments of the comparison stimuli be concomittantly accessed. Recent or frequent concomitance in priming these stimuli could increase the likelihood of such coaccessibility (Higgins et al, 1985) . For instance, a professor who has recently written recommendation letters on behalf of Dr. Smith and Dr. James, both former students, may be more likely to compare their relative performance than one who has recently written for one of the two but not the other, or for neither.
Coaccessibility may also be determined by the way relevant cognitions are organized in memory. Assuming a network model of memory organization (e.g, Anderson, 1984) , the two comparison stimuli might be closely linked so that accessing one would immediately bring the other to mind. For instance, if Maria Callas is closely linked in one's memory with Renata Tebaldi, thinking of Maria may render Renata accessible (and vice versa), increasing the likelihood of a comparison between the two. Alternatively, a given stimulus (e.g., the self) could be closely associated with a given dimension (e.g, academic performance). Activating the dimension through judging another stimulus (e.g., judging the academic performance of a political candidate) may render the first stimulus accessible and increase the likelihood of comparing the two, even though they are not normally linked in one's memory Alternative linkages in memory might exist, for instance, temporal linkages. In this vein, Levine and Moreland (1986, p. 289) noted that"intratemporal comparisons are more common than intertemporal comparisons, because outcomes and related attributes that occur at the same point in time [italics added ] are easier to compare than are those that occur at different points in time: ' It is noteworthy that mere coaccessibility of judgments is not presently considered a sufficient condition for comparison. As emphasized earlier, comparison requires that a goal of comparative knowledge be in place. At the same time, easy accessibility of the relevant evidence may increase the likelihood of adopting such a goal (given its general attractiveness) in that its attainment would not require considerable investments of time and effort. Further research could profitably explore the foregoing notions concerning coaccessibility effects in social comparison.
Feature Matching Processes
Given that the separate judgments of the comparison stimuli have been rendered and that they are coaccessible in the individual's mind, the question still remains of how the comparison is carried out. Important advances in understanding these phenomena were based on Tversky's (1977) model of similarity comparisons. In that model, judgmental asymmetries are predicted in accordance with the distinction between the subject and the referent of the comparison. The subject of the comparison is the starting point, or the object being compared; the referent is the target of the comparison to which the subject is compared. Thus, in comparing a Nissan with a Toyota, the Nissan is the subject and the Toyota the referent.
According to Tversky, comparison is carried out through mapping the features of the subject onto those of the referent. In such a process the subject's features predominate, and the referent features are considered to the extent that they correspond to the subject's. An intriguing implication of this analysis is that when the subject has more unique features than the referent, the two objects will be judged as less similar than if the referent has more unique features than the subject. This prediction was borne out in Tversky's research using judgments of similarity between prominent countries (like the USSR) and less prominent ones (like Poland). Assuming that subjects have more unique knowledge about prominent than nonprominent countries, Tversky was able to demonstrate that when the former are the subject of the comparison, judged similarity is lower than when they are the referent. Extending this logic, Srull and Gaelick (1983) found that comparisons of self(about which one has ample unique knowledge) with others (about whom one has less unique knowledge) resulted in judgments of greater dissimilarity than comparisons of others with self. Additional studies reporting asymmetries in similarity judgments in accordance with the subject/referent distinction were performed by Holyoak and Gordon (1983) and by Read (1987) .
The distinction between the subject and the referent of comparison has implications for dimensions other than similarity Agostinelli, Sherman, Fazio, and Hearst (1986) found that when an object viewed a second time is used as the subject compared against (the referent of) first viewing, additions (i.e., features present the second time but not the firs0 are better noticed than deletions (features present the first time but not the second). Similarly, when the first viewing is used as the subject, deletions are better noticed than additions. Finally, Houston et al. (1989) demonstrated in a series of four experiments that when the unique features of the subject are negative, the referent object is likely to be preferred, even though it may contain equally negative unique features. Similarly, when the unique features of the subject are positive, it is likely to be preferred over a referent containing equally positive unique features. As Houston et al. (1989) noted the subject/referent asymmetry is probably applicable to other domains of comparison beyond similarity, change, or preference, including comparisons of objects and categories, comparison of present with past or future selves, and comparisons of one's actual state with a standard of attainment (Higgins, Straumann, & Klein, 1986) .
A general process possibly underlying the subject/referent asymmetry in comparisons is people's tendency to neglect those features of the referent that are not represented in the subject. Potential boundary conditions for these effects could be motivational. Thus, one might expect that when the comparison outcome is consequential (vs. inconsequential), persons may engage in a more thorough search and switch the positions of subject and referent between the entities compared, thus eliminating the assymetry. Further motivational effects may determine the importance of features' primacy in comparisons and of the relative weight attached to common versus unique features. For instance, a person highly motivated to reach cognitive closure concerning a comparison may reach a different conclusion depending on whether the subject's unique features were considered before the common ones, or vice versa: If the unique features came first, the closure striving individual might be more likely to conclude, for example, that the comparison stimuli are different than if the common ones came first. In contrast, a person highly motivated to reach an accurate judgment may not be as affected by the features' primacy (Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) . Finally, a person highly motivated to avoid closure (e.g, a parent refusing to decide which of her children is more intelligent) may give greater weight to the common features of the two stimuli (e.g, as reflected in better recall or greater perceived importance of those features) than to the unique features. Those issues could be profitably pursued in future, structurally oriented research on social comparisons.
Summary
In the preceding section we discussed the comparative structure of social comparisons. Such structure includes judgments of the separate comparison stimuli and their juxtaposition. This has numerous implications for the determinants of comparison outcomes. Some such determinants relate to judgmental context differences in encoding the individual stimuli. These contextual differences may pertain to the differential accessibility of data about the comparison stimuli, as well as constructs and situational standards in which terms the data are encoded.
To be manifest, comparison effects based on encoding differences depend on the stimuli being juxtaposed in the first place. A major determinant of such a juxtaposition is coaccessibility of the separate judgments, in turn assumed to be affected by the recency and frequency of their joint activation and by the nature of their structural interconnections in a memory structure. Any coaccessibility may set in motion a comparative process given the appropriate motivation. The juxtaposition itself may be carried out in a feature matching fashion, as described by Tversky (1977) . Such a procedure assigns major significance to the structural distinction between the subject and the referent of comparison, whereby the unique features of the subject exert a predominant influence on the comparison outcome. The structural level of analysis opens up numerous new avenues of possible comparison research, only some of which have begun to be recently explored.
Contents of Social Comparisons
A great deal of variability in social comparison phenomena may be accounted for by the particular contents of comparison.
By contents we mean the specifics of the comparison "question" (Smith, 1981) , including the domain of the comparison, the person or standard with whom one compares, and the subjective meaning that the comparison outcome has for the person as a guide to self-regulation or evaluation (Higgins, 1987) . According to the present conception, the contents of possible social comparisons are highly diverse. This follows from our assumptions that social comparisons are a type of judgment, and that the contents of judgments are free to vary on an unlimited number of dimensions. Thus, not only should persons be capable of seeking comparisons in different possible domains, but they might seek them against diverse types of comparison others. Such implication constrasts with the classical comparison notion that people's pervasive interest is in their standing in comparison to a similar referent (Festinger, 1954a ). We will review some research evidence pertinent to this issue.
The heterogeneity of possible self-evaluations has been noted by early workers in the field. In 1966 Singer summed up a special issue of the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology devoted to social comparison by commenting that "if a person wishes to evaluate himself on an ability X there are several kinds of evaluations he can make" (p. 107). Indeed, specific studies in that journal issue illustrated some of the types of possible comparison, including comparison with a positive example (Thornton & Arrowood, 1966) and with someone doing better (Wheeler, 1966) or worse (Hakmiller, 1966) 
Subsequent research has demonstrated yet other types of possible comparison. For instance, Wheeler et al. (1969) found that most of their subjects exhibited a "range-seeking" tendency Arrowood and Friend (1969) found a comparison preference for the "positive instance"; Wilson and Benner (1971 ) found a preference for the results of the "best off"; and Friend and Gilbert (1973) demonstrated that subjects can be interested in both the "best off" and the "worst off" cases. Similarly, Ctruder (1977) presented evidence that people may seek various kinds of comparative information. As he summarized it:
They want very much to learn about the highest scoring other.... They are also interested in the other who best represents a definition of the dimension, the "positive instance." and they want to compare themselves with others who are better offthan they are on the dimension. (pp. 37-38) Taken as a whole, the above research seems to contradict Festinger's original proposal and to suggest that people are often interested in comparative knowledge about dissimilar as well as similar others. However, the similarity hypothesis was restated in a modified form in Goethals and Darley's (1977) revision of social comparison theory In this conceptualization the critical similarity dimension was assumed to be similarity on attributes relevant to the performance rather than similarity of the performance itself. In support of this line of reasoning, Zanna, Goethals, and Hill (1975) and Suls, Gastorf, and Lawhon (1978) reported a preference for information about the resuits of similar sex and age groups regardless of similarity in performance. Goethals and Darley's (1977) influential revision inspired further research, which indicated, nonetheless, that people may desire diverse kinds of comparative information (Miller, 1984; Taylor & Lobel, in press; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982; Wills, 1981) . Although information about others similar in attributes is often sought, people occasionally may be interested in others who are similar to them in performance (Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982) , others who are dissimilar in performance (Gruder, 1971 ; Wheeler & Koestner, 1984) , and others with whom they identify or toward whom they feel a bond (Miller et al., 1988) , or they may ignore an attribute's relevance to performance altogether (Miller, 1984) . These findings are typically interpreted as inconsistent with the notion that people uniformly prefer information about similar others (Suls, 1986) . More generally, the foregoing review ~upports the present notion that the types of referent others with whom persons might wish to compare are quite diverse and unconstrained. As with judgments in all categories, any specific contents of social comparison might be of interest to some people in some circumstances. Thus, in some conditions people might be interested in comparative judgments involving similar others, whereas in other conditions they may be interested in comparisons involving dissimilar others. Occasionally, people may be interested in comparing with successful and affluent individuals (irrespective of their similarity to oneself), whereas in other situations they might be interested in comparing with failing or destitute persons. Furthermore, comparative appraisals need not refer to other people. Instead, they can refer to various standards of conduct or performance, including standards of duty (ought) and of desire (ideal), one's own standards or those of significant others (Higgins, Straumann, & Klein, 1986) , past or present standards (Albert, 1977) , and so forth. The importance of internalized standards in social comparison contexts was explicitly noted by Gruder (1971) .
Domains of Comparison
Not only may the referents of social comparison vary considerably, but so may the domains in which comparison is carried out. As noted earlier, classical social comparison theory distinguished between the comparison of opinions and abilities (Festinger, 1954a ). Subsequently, interest has centered around the comparison of emotions (Schachter, 1959) , values (Goethals & Darley, 1977) , outcomes (Crosby, 1982; Levine & Moreland, 1986 Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986) , or features (Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Houston et al., 1989; Tversky, 1977) . Our present perspective implies more generally that social comparisons can be made on all dimensions on which people can be described, including status (whether ascribed or achieved), attractiveness, attainments, life-style, good or bad fortune, taste, and social sensitivity.
Categories and Standards oJComparison
Within each domain of comparison, it should be possible to distinguish between various categories of comparison subjects as well as referents. Thus, Levine and Moreland (1986, 1987) recently proposed a three-dimensional typology of outcome comparisons including the factors of(a) comparison type (selfself, self-other, and group-group), (b) social context (intragroup or intergroup), and (c) temporal context (intratemporal vs. intertemporal) .
A typology of standards for attribute comparisons proposed by Higgins (in press) distinguishes between three basic categories of standards: (a) factuals, (b) guides, and (c) possibilities.
Factuals are defined as "standards that involve a person's beliefs about the actual performance of one or more persons" (Higgins, in press, p. 21 ). In Higgins's typology, some major categories of factuals are those related to "social category," "meaningful other" "biographical," and "social context?'
Guides are defined as "standards that involve representations of those attributes that from the standpoint of some social appraiser.., are valued or preferred for some social target" (Higgins, in press, p. 23) . Higgins distinguished between four subcategories of guides---"self-guides;' "other guides" "normative guides" and "social context" guides. These various subcategories may be further subdivided. For instance, self-guides are clustered into (a) ideal/own self-guides denoting attributes a person would ideally like to possess, (b) ideal/other self-guides denoting the person's representation of similar attributes that some significant other is believed to possess, (c) ought/own selfguides denoting the person's perceived duties and obligations, and (d) ought/other self-guides denoting the person's representation of his or her duties and obligations according to a significant other.
Finally, possibilities are defined as "representations of... the attributes of a target person (self or other) that are perceived as non-factual (i.e., to have never actually existed for the target) but are possible (i.e., will exist, could or might exist, could or might have existed)" (Higgins, in press, p. 29) . Possibilities are subdivided into self-possibilities, other possibilities, and social context possibilities. Each of these is further partitioned into "can possibilities;' "future possibilities," and "counterfactual possibilities?' Whereas both Higgins's and Levine and Moreland's typologies are deduced from conceptual analyses, it is possible to construct such typologies inductively. Work by M. Ross et al. (1986) exemplifies the approach. These investigators set out to explore the "social standards people use to assess their satisfaction" (p. 83). Subjects were asked to indicate how happy or satisfied they were in various life domains and how they decided whether they were happy in a particular domain. It was found, among other things, that in evaluating satisfaction with life at home or work most respondents (89% and 82%, respectively) named a familiar other (family, friends, coworkers, or other acquaintances) as the comparison referent. By contrast, in evaluating their life as a whole, a lower proportion of respondents (61%) named familiar others, and they were more likely to name unfamiliar others in determining their degree of satisfaction. It is also of interest that social comparisons or comparisons with the past were rather unlikely to be spontaneously invoked by respondents as bases of satisfaction or happiness judgments. Instead, such judgments were predominantly derived from subjects' own affect or perceived discrepancy from achievement goals.
Psychological Significance of Particular Comparison Contents
Whether arrived at conceptually or empirically, the utility of any typology of comparisons presumably depends on the degree to which it taps distinctions in significant psychological antecedents and consequences. For instance, Levine and Moreland (1986, pp. 295-296) hypothesized that self-self comparisons are likely to be made with greater confidence than selfother comparisons, which in turn are presumed to be made more confidently than group-group comparisons. Also ac-cording to these authors, the ease of distorting information is negatively related to confidence; thus, greater efforts to distort comparison information should be expended in connection with group-group versus self-group versus self-self comparisons. Although of considerable interest, these hypotheses (as well as additional ones advanced by Levine & Moreland, 1987) are speculative at this time and in need of further empirical probing for their validation.
The significance of Higgins's (in press) typology of comparison standards is exemplified by work on the affective consequences of discrepancies from self-guides. Specifically, Higgins and his colleagues hypothesized that quality of experienced affect should differ in accordance with the type of guide from which one is discrepant: A self-discrepancy from an "ideal" guide represents the absence of positive outcomes (i.e., a failure to fulfill one's wishes and desires). This should lead to feelings of dejection such as dissatisfaction, disappointment, or sadness. In contrast, a discrepancy from an "ought" guide represents the presence of negative outcomes (i.e., an expectation of punishment for failing to uphold one's obligations and duties), leading to agitation-type emotions o f worry, threat, or edginess. Numerous studies by Higgins and his colleagues Strauman & Higgins, 1987) provide compelling evidence that different discrepancies produce different affective experiences (i.e., dejection vs. agitation), just as predicted by the model. Remaining types of comparison standards in Higgins's (in press) typology are also assumed to yield distinct patterns of psychological consequences (Higgins, Tykocinski, & Vookles, in press ). Similarly, research on "downward" and "upward" comparisons (e.g., Taylor, & Lobel, in press) shows distinct affective reactions as a consequence of either comparison.
Standards' of Entitlement and Relative Deprivation
A comparison standard of considerable psychological significance concerns the level of outcomes to which one feels entitled (Austin, 1977; Austin, McGinn, & Sasmilch, 1980; Crosby, 1982; Major & Testa, 1989; Masters & Smith, 1987; Olson & Ross, 1984; Olson et al, 1986) . In this connection, Olson and Ross (1984) found that perceived entitlement varied positively as a function of perceived investments (e.g., practice) or subjects' similarity to comparison others who received a reward for their investment (e.g., were employed rather than unemployed). Major and Testa (1989, Experiment 1) also demonstrated that the comparison other's outcome may determine the subject's perception of the general outcome (wage) standard, and consequently their feelings of entitlement and dissatisfaction if their outcome fell below the perceived entitlement level.
The foregoing research suggests that for externally awarded outcomes (e.g., wage level at an organization or employment opportunity in a profession), social comparison may be used to determine the subjective entitlement function (i.e, how much and what type of investment is perceived to entitle one to a given level of reward). Such an entitlement function may then govern subjects' judgment concerning the fairness of their own received outcomes. In turn, depending on other relevant beliefs (e.g., whether the world generally is or should be just; Lerner, 1980) , perceptions of fairness may or may not lead to various reactions (e.g., of resentment, bitterness, or rebellion aimed at promoting social change).
Note that not all outcome comparisons need to concern the issue of entitlement. Often, they may be used to deduce alternative contents of judgment in which persons could be interested. Thus, outcome comparisons may provide evidence about one's degree of good fortune or one's degree of skill relative to others, one's rate of upward or downward mobility, or the society's apparent recognition of one's contributions relative to others'.
Summary
In the preceding section we addressed the content level of social comparison phenomena. It has been noted that the contents of social comparisons are highly diverse, including heterogeneous domains of comparisons, standards of comparison, and different types of comparison others. In this light, the contention of classical comparison theory (Festinger, 1954a (Festinger, , 1954b that persons generally compare with similar others seems unduly restrictive. Our conceptual analysis, as well as extant empirical evidence, suggests that people may often compare with dissimilar others, and that the similarity dimension may often be irrelevant to social comparison.
Whereas the possible content features of social comparisons seem virtually inexhaustible, they are of essential significance to understanding the psychological antecedents and consequences of specific comparisons. For instance, understanding the affect generated by a comparison, or the action undertaken in response to a comparison outcome, requires analysis at the content level in which the subjective meanings of the comparison context are clearly delineated. In this sense, the contentlevel analysis of social comparison phenomena seems quite indispensible. Simply, the questions it may be able to answer are inappropriate to even raise on the judgmental or comparative levels of analysis considered earlier.
Concluding Comments
Historically, Festinger's (1954a Festinger's ( , 1954b ) theory of social comparison processes has served the important functions of attracting attention to this topic of study and setting its research agenda for years to come. Not surprisingly, however, three and a half decades later, conceptual and empirical developments in cognitive social psychology have outstepped the limits of the initial conception and exposed its inadequacy in handling the complex comparison issues of interest today: Nor is it likely" that buttressing the original conceptualization by auxiliary assumptions and boundary conditions would suffice to salvage the framework and extricate it from its fundamental difficulties. Essentially, classical comparison theory seems both too fixed and too narrow to readily accommodate contemporary research on the topic. The theory seems too fixed in its portrayal of people as nearly always driven to self-evaluate through social comparison, doing so mostly with similar others, and nearly always striving to attain evaluative accuracy. In contrast, the present analysis suggests that people may often lack the desire to compare and that even when they do not lack such a desire, the comparison need not be with similar others. Furthermore, accuracy, though often of importance, may not be the exclusive or predominant basis of social comparisons (Wood, 1989) . Thus, comparison tendencies appear to be highly fluid and contingent on the overall psychological context affecting human judgment.
The classical theory also seems too narrow in its predominant emphasis on locus of comparison issues and on interpersonal similarity between subjects and referents of comparison. This excludes a plethora of comparison problems of considerable relevance to social interaction, including the diverse psychological functions of comparison, the fine-grained cognitive processes mediating comparison outcomes, and the multiple affects and actions engendered by various comparisons.
In fact, the variety of potentially significant comparison issues seems so vast that the power of any single theory to do it justice may be seriously doubted. Instead of attempting to formulate such a theory, our analysis explicitly acknowledged the "variance" and "partitioned" it by levels of analysis. Such an approach offers several advantages. First, it provides a framework for systematically ordering the multifarious past research on social comparisons. Second, it identifies separate problem clusters within the general social comparison domain that may require distinct conceptual handling for their explication. Thus, unlike past research that tied most comparison issues under investigation (e.g., issues of entitlement, jealousy, or coping with stress) to the same few classical parameters (e.g., similarity of the comparison other), the present approach allows greater conceptual independence among comparison problems. According to this perspective, understanding a contentlevel problem (e.g., the affective consequences of failure to meet one's obligation) involves concepts largely unrelated to constructs used to depict the judgmental process at large. Similarly, understanding judgmental-level phenomena as accessibility, rules of inference, or epistemic motivations requires concepts unrelated to (content-level) notions of justice, obligation, and so forth. Thus, our multileveled approach may allow unique social comparison phenomena to play a greater role in drMng relevant theory development than has been the case so far. Additionally, however, our approach recognizes that all levels o fanalysis are inexorably involved in any specific instance of social comparison, and therefore that all are needed to fully explicate the phenomena at stake.
Finally, by casting a broader conceptual net for framing social comparison questions, the present approach promises to open numerous new avenues for further exploration. For instance, the judgmental-process level of analysis suggests research questions about conditions for comparison, preferred sources of comparison information, and the course and direction of the comparison activity as affected by factors of accessibility, perceived relevance, and epistemic motivations. The structural level of analysis suggests questions about the interrelation of the comparison stimuli, including differences in their encoding contexts, the simultaneity with which they come to mind, and the order in which they are considered. The content level of analysis suggests questions about the subjective meanings people may attach to various comparison outcomes and the implications these meanings have for self-evaluation and regulation.
In short, a multilevel reorientation of social comparison research may afford a richer, tess restrictive study of comparison issues than has been typical within the classical paradigm. Such a reorientation seems warranted both by past research and by the opportunities it extends for future work on this fundamental social psychological topic.
